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There is a widespread sense that the Front National (FN) came of age in 2014 as a challenger 
for power in France. The municipal and European elections appeared to herald a 
transformation in the party’s development and prospects, demonstrating its capacity to 
compete as a major player at subnational and supranational levels following strong 
performances at the national level in the presidential and legislative elections of 2012. This 
article takes a critical view of that assessment. It argues that the FN in 2014 made significant 
progress but that the apparent surge of support for the party in these elections belies 
fundamental weaknesses in the depth and range of its electoral capacities and in its prospects 
for transforming itself into a party of government. These weaknesses were again evident in 
the departmental elections of 2015, confirming that the FN has not succeeded in ending 
bipolarisation and imposing a genuinely tripartite structure on French politics. Far from being 
the ‘first party of France’ and ‘at the gates of power’, the FN is still consigned primarily to a 
role of spoiler, with its progression stalled by institutional obstacles, electoral limitations and 













To judge by newspaper headlines, online commentaries and the pronouncements of 
politicians, 2014 was a year when the tectonic plates of French politics shifted. The municipal 
elections of March were greeted by a profusion of portentous natural images – a ‘seismic 
event’, a ‘shock’, a ‘thunderclap’, an ‘earthquake’ (Fressoz, 2014; Galiero, 2014a; Lichfield, 
2014; La Tribune, 2014). In similar vein, the European elections of May saw a ‘seismic’ shift 
in French politics, a ‘tsunami’ and ‘tidal wave’, a ‘big bang’ bringing in its wake ‘profound 
changes’ to ‘devastate the French political landscape’ (Oliveau, 2014; Jaxel-Truer and 
Wieder, 2014; Le Monde, 2014a). 
 
The inspiration for these images in both elections was the performance by the Front National 
(FN), which won control of 11 town and city councils in March then came top of the 
European poll in May with almost 25 per cent of the vote and the largest share (24) of 
France’s 74 seats in the European Parliament. This unprecedented success was described by 
Jean-Luc Mélenchon of the far-left Front de Gauche as a ‘volcanic eruption’ and by Prime 
Minister Manuel Valls as ‘a shock, an earthquake’ sending its effects across France’s entire 
political establishment (Le Figaro, 2014; Garat, 2014). 
 
This representation of the far right as an irresistible political force is not new; nor is it 
confined to France. A burgeoning academic literature has begun to focus on the effects of 
media projection on the image and fortunes of far-right parties in different European 
countries (Mazzoleni et al, 2003; Walgrave and de Swert, 2004; Boomgaarden and 
Vliegenthart, 2007; Akkerman, 2011; Ellinas, 2014). The  often disproportionate coverage by 
the media masks a paradox: while the mainstream media are almost universally antipathetic 
to far-right parties, they enter a pact of mutually beneficial dependence: the media need ‘the 
story’ and the parties need the attention. What these parties stand to gain from a raised public 
profile is an increased perception of their importance and a greater likelihood of being ‘taken 
seriously’ (Bos et al, 2011: 197); and the more powerful the media projection, the more their 
legitimacy is arguably bolstered (Kallis, 2013: 227). At what point, we might then ask, does 
proclaiming the far right’s strength become a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ (Mondon, 2015: 145)? 
 
The media in France have long indulged in such inflated reporting of the FN; there is little 
here that is new bar the degree of hyperbole deployed. What marks more of a change is the 
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shift in the academic literature from perceiving the FN as a nuisance party (Shields, 1997), a 
marginal force confined to a role of oppositional protest (Perrineau, 1993, 2003; Fourquet, 
2008), to asking whether it might be becoming a potential contender for power. In a study of 
French political parties published in 1989, Colette Ysmal summed up the FN’s ‘destiny’ as an 
outsider party ‘obliged to distinguish itself at all costs from the forces of “government”’. By 
this analysis, and others like it, the FN was the antithesis of a party of government, defined in 
its very essence by not being one and inviting the question of how long it could last in such 
oppositional isolation (Ysmal, 1989: 149-150; Perrineau, 1993: 159).  
 
Since the change of leadership in 2011 and the subsequent upturn in the party’s electoral 
fortunes, analysts have posed quite different questions. Has the FN under Marine Le Pen 
transformed itself from an anti-system outsider to a ‘mainstreamed’ political force and 
‘Republican democratic contender’ (Mondon, 2014)? Has the political landscape in France, 
for so long subject to the iron law of bipolarisation, become effectively tripartite, or do the 
institutional constraints of France’s majoritarian system remain as firmly embedded as ever 
(de Voogd, 2014; Revault d'Allonnes, 2015; Hausalter, 2015)? Or, again, is ‘a particular 
synthesis between old and new politics’ now at work to reshape France’s political landscape 
by gradual evolution rather than any seismic event (Tiberj, 2013: 71)? And, in the space 
opened up by this evolution, has a party historically consigned to exclusion now come of age 
as a genuine challenger for power (Dézé, 2012; Perrineau, 2014)?  
 
This article approaches these questions through an analysis of three recent elections in 
France: the municipal and European elections of 2014 and the departmental elections of 
2015. It takes a critical view of the too-frequent tendency to overstate the FN’s advance and 
the impact it is purported to exert in redrawing the contours of French politics. It argues that 
the FN since 2012 has made significant progress but that the apparent surge of support for the 
party in these elections belies fundamental weaknesses in the depth and range of its electoral 
capacities and in its prospects for transforming itself into a party of government. The FN, it 
concludes, has not succeeded in ending bipolarisation and imposing a genuinely tripartite 
structure on French politics. Far from being the ‘first party of France’ (Rouart, 2014) and ‘at 
the gates of power’ (Bretton, 2015), it is still consigned primarily to a role of spoiler, with its 
progression stalled by institutional obstacles, electoral limitations and a political containment 





The Municipal elections – a ‘seismic event’? 
 
In March 2014, the FN entered local government. From holding no elected office, it secured 
control of 11 municipalities with a combined population of some 400,000 and a six-year 
mandate to implement its policies. These municipal elections were a success not only in 
terms of executive gains but in terms, too, of the 1,544 council seats won across France, 483 
of those on the first ballot. This was well in advance of the 1,000 seats that had been the 
party’s declared target and incomparably more than the 59 seats it had won in the previous 
municipal elections of 2008. Fielding a record 585 lists in communes of over 1,000 
inhabitants (compared with 122 lists in 2008), it contested over 400 towns of more than 9,000 
inhabitants (up from 106 in 2008) (Brouard and Foucault, 2014). It qualified for run-offs in 
321 municipalities, of which it contested 317, averaging 14.8 per cent where present in the 
first round (compared with 5.5 per cent in 2008) and 17.2 per cent in the second.  
 
These results were a vindication of the strategic decision to target FN lists in municipalities 
where the party had performed well in the 2012 presidential and legislative elections and 
stood the strongest chance of getting councillors elected. These lay mainly in Mediterranean 
littoral departments where FN strength was long-established and in departments scarred by 
post-industrial restructuring across the north and north-east where the FN had made deep 
inroads into once left-wing working-class territory (Crépon, 2012). The most significant town 
and city councils captured were the 7th sector of Marseille with over 150,000 inhabitants, 
Béziers (over 71,000) and Fréjus (over 52,000), all three located in the FN’s Mediterranean 
heartlands. Other smaller towns won were Beaucaire, Le Pontet, Cogolin and Le Luc in the 
south and Hénin-Beaumont, Villers-Cotterêts, Mantes-la-Ville and Hayange in the north.   
 
In some locations, most notably the steel-manufacturing town of Hayange in the Moselle 
department and the former coalmining town of Hénin-Beaumont in the Pas-de-Calais, the 
FN’s wins bore the imprint of the party’s policy turn towards a markedly left-leaning, 
protectionist agenda pledging lower taxes, income redistribution and the preservation of 
public services. As evidence of the FN’s growing appeal across the right-left divide, most of 
its councils were captured from the left, not from the right – four from the Socialist Party 
(Hayange, Mantes-la-Ville, Villers-Cotterêts, Marseille-7th sector) and two from the ‘divers 
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gauche’ (Hénin-Beaumont, Le Luc), with Marseille’s 7th sector in particular being a 
longstanding Socialist working-class stronghold.  
 
The election of FN municipal councillors in these targeted locations and elsewhere also 
facilitated the election of 459 FN representatives to intercommunal councils 
(‘intercommunalités’). In all, then, these elections must be seen as marking an important 
advance in the institutionalisation of the FN. They confirmed the stabilisation of the FN vote 
two years on from the legislative elections of 2012 and consolidated its place as the third 
party of France at local as well as national level. Most significantly, they allowed the FN to 
invest in an essential dimension of its growth strategy: the cultivation of local power bases.   
 
These municipal elections, however, were far from constituting a ‘seismic event’ and did 
more to expose the FN’s limitations than to demonstrate its strengths. Though it fielded a 
record 585 lists in communes of more than 1,000 inhabitants, this represented a very small 
proportion (6 per cent) of the 9,663 such communes across France. It was a figure rivalled by 
the much smaller Parti de Gauche, which also fielded close to 600 lists. Of the 317 run-offs it 
contested, the FN won only ten (having secured Hénin-Beaumont on the first round, its one 
outright gain from 203 councils won on the first round). Worryingly for the party’s electoral 
strategists, it saw its aggregate support fall rather than rise between the two rounds, notably in 
three-way run-offs (Evans and Ivaldi, 2014a). Whereas some little known candidates 
surprised by the strength of their performance to secure their post as mayor, party 
heavyweights enjoying strong first-round leads such as Louis Aliot in Perpignan (34.2 per 
cent), Florian Philippot in Forbach (35.7 per cent) and Gilbert Collard in Saint-Gilles (42.6 
per cent) failed to win their councils, while Marion Maréchal-Le Pen’s list in Sorgues with 
33.8 per cent went down to defeat by the centre-right Union pour un Mouvement Populaire 
(UMP) in the first round. These failures to deliver council majorities in relatively favourable 
locations underlined the weakness still of the FN’s grassroots implantation and the limitations 
of deploying national ‘notables’ in local elections. 
 
Looked at within the bigger picture of these elections, the FN’s performance again spoke 
more of weakness than of strength. It won 11 towns of over 9,000 inhabitants out of more 
than 1,000 such towns (1,081) across France – just one in 100. It secured 12 out of over 
36,500 mayorships (one in 3,000), adding to the above 11 town halls the village of Le Hamel 
in the Oise department with its population of fewer than 200. Across the 585 municipal 
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communes selected as most favourable by the FN, it won under 15 per cent of the vote and 
under 8 per cent of the seats with its 1,544 councillors out of over 20,000 at stake there 
(Evans and Ivaldi, 2014b) and over half a million at stake across the country as a whole. All 
of this must be seen as a poor return for a party polling historically up to 15 per cent in 
national elections. It provides a sharp corrective to the less than measured claim made in Le 
Figaro that these municipal elections confirmed the FN’s ‘entrenchment across the entirety of 
France’ (Galiero, 2014b). 
 
The instructive comparison is not with the preceding municipal elections of 2008, which 
marked a low point in the FN’s fortunes following its heavy losses in the legislative elections 
of 2007 (4.3 per cent), but with those of 1995. Then, the party had run 490 lists and won 
control of the southern towns of Orange and Marignane (both with close to 30,000 
inhabitants) as well as the major port of Toulon (with its population of 170,000), going on in 
1997 to add the further medium-sized town of Vitrolles. Analysis of its performance in towns 
with over 30,000 inhabitants showed little progress over the twenty-year interim, between a 
12.8 per cent share of the vote in 1995 and a 13.6 per cent share in 2014. In larger towns of 
over 100,000 inhabitants, there was even less progress, from 12 per cent in 1995 to 12.3 per 
cent in 2014 (Gougou and Persico, 2014). In terms of council seats won, too, there was 
improvement but not on a grand scale, from 1,249 seats won in 1995 to 1,544 in 2014, an 
increase of less than a quarter. And as a national percentage, the FN’s 4.8 per cent in 2014 
was on a par with its national score in 1995.  
 
The 2014 elections can be most accurately seen, then, as a return to a level of municipal 
challenge predating the party split of 1999 which destroyed much of the FN’s local 
infrastructure and drained a large part of its activist base. Though its well targeted 
performance in 2014 yielded more towns, comparison between the 1995 and 2014 municipal 
elections showed the uneven nature of the party’s recovery from that damaging split. While 
regions of historic strength (Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur, Languedoc-Roussillon) and 
developing strength (Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Picardie, Champagne-Ardenne) saw the FN 
consolidate and reinforce its local presence, and while the party continued to extend patchily 
into ‘terres de mission’ in the west and south-west, other areas of FN strength in 1995 (Ile-de 
France, Rhône-Alpes, and to a degree Alsace) showed an FN vote in retreat in 2014. In some 
localities, the FN was unable to rebuild its activist base sufficiently to constitute electoral lists 




A more recent comparison with the legislative elections of 2012 also called into question the 
electoral dynamic of the FN in 2014. Analysis of the 2012 election results broken down by 
municipal commune showed a compound gain for the party of some 10 per cent in terms of 
votes cast in 2014; but the average difference in percentage share of the vote between the first 
rounds of the legislative and the municipal elections was almost nil, with marked gains in 
some locations offset by losses elsewhere (Evans and Ivaldi, 2014c). In some strongholds, the 
FN vote share dropped – by 5 percentage points in Saint-Gilles and 3 points in Sorgues, to 
cite just the two municipalities contested by the FN’s parliamentary deputies, Gilbert Collard 
and Marion Maréchal-Le Pen, neither of whom succeeded in securing victory. Rather than an 
electoral dynamic, such results suggested at best a stalled progression in locations where the 
FN might have been expected to capitalise on ground previously gained.  
 
This did not prevent Marine Le Pen from proclaiming ‘the end of bipolarised politics’ (Le 
Monde, 2014b) despite a configuration of results that clearly indicated the opposite. While 
the FN emerged from the first round with 4.8 per cent of the nationwide vote, the Union de la 
Droite, ‘divers droite’ and UMP took a combined 43 per cent and the Union de la Gauche, 
‘divers gauche’ and PS 34 per cent. This picture of an overwhelmingly bipolarised political 
landscape was reinforced by the second round, with the FN taking 6.7 per cent of the overall 
vote against 44 per cent for the combined right and 39 per cent for the combined left (Interior 
Ministry, 2014a). Far from redrawing the political map, these elections merely laid bare the 
limited ambitions, resources and achievements of an FN unable to break the duopoly of the 
UMP and the PS at the heart of their respective centre-right and centre-left blocs. 
 
 
The European elections – a ‘big bang’? 
 
Unlike the municipal elections of March, the European elections of May 2014 brought 
together a set of conditions highly favourable to the FN, contested as they were over a single 
round of voting on the basis of proportional representation. Perceived as ‘second-order’ 
elections with low national stakes, European elections have since their introduction in 1979 
offered non-mainstream parties an opportunity to reap rewards in accordance with their vote 
share. It was the European elections of 1984 that saw the breakthrough of the FN as a 
national party with a vote share of almost 11 per cent and 10 MEPs. That breakthrough was 
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followed by renewed successes in 1989 (11.7 per cent: 10 MEPs) and 1994 (10.5 per cent: 11 
MEPs) before the split of the party in 1999 presaged a drop to 5.7 per cent of the vote and 
five MEPs (Shields, 2007).  
 
The following elections of June 2004 were organised on a new basis less readily favourable 
to the FN. Whereas in previous European elections seats had been allocated proportionally on 
a national basis, the system introduced for these elections divided France into eight inter-
regional constituencies with MEPs drawn proportionally from party lists in each. With 9.8 
per cent of the vote overall, the FN took 7 seats yielded by five of these new constituencies. 
In the subsequent elections of 2009, after the collapse of the FN vote in the 2007 legislative 
elections, the party managed to secure only 6.3 per cent of the vote and three MEPs, its 
lowest return in 25 years of competing in these elections. 
 
As the first European poll to be contested by the FN under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, 
the 2014 elections were seen as a test of how far the party could reverse this downward trend 
and build on its new momentum after the strong electoral recovery of 2012. Pre-election polls 
tipped the FN to perform more strongly than ever and maybe come first ahead of the UMP. In 
the event, the margin by which the FN did win this election exceeded even the most generous 
predictions. With 24.9 per cent of the vote, it finished well ahead of the UMP’s 20.8 per cent 
and with almost double the score of the PS-led Union de la Gauche on just under 14 per cent. 
The closest lists thereafter were the Union du Centre with 9.9 per cent and Europe-Ecologie-
Les Verts (EELV) with 8.9 per cent (Interior Ministry, 2014b).  
 
This resounding victory, the FN’s first in nationwide elections, gave the party 24 seats in the 
European Parliament (an eightfold increase on its 2009 showing) compared with the UMP’s 
20 and the Socialists’ 13. It quadrupled its most recent European election vote tally of 
1,091,691 in 2009 to 4,712,461, more than doubling its historically highest vote of 2.2 
million in 1984 (Le Gall, 2014). This was the strongest vote count ever recorded by the FN as 
a party in any election, exceeded only by the presidential election scores of 2002 and 2012, 
though far in advance of both in terms of percentage vote share.  
 
Whereas in 2009 the FN had strained to win a seat in three of the eight Euro-constituencies, 
in 2014 it topped the poll in five of those constituencies – North-West (33.6 per cent), East 
(29 per cent), South-East (28.2 per cent), South-West (24.7 per cent) and Massif-Central 
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Centre (24.2 per cent). Even in the west of the country, where the FN had never been strong, 
the Liste Bleu Marine – Non à Bruxelles, Oui à la France took 19.3 per cent of the vote. This 
was an extraordinary performance in a Euro-constituency where the FN had scored 5.6 per 
cent in 2004 and 3 per cent in 2009, confirmation of the party’s success in pushing beyond its 
established strongholds in the north, north-east and south-east to set down roots in the ‘terres 
de mission’ of the west.  
 
To be beaten into second place here by the UMP (19.6 per cent) with a margin of just 0.3 per 
cent was arguably the most arresting result of these elections. Completing the picture with 17 
per cent and again a second-place finish after the UMP in Ile-de-France, a region where it had 
posted a score of 4.4 per cent in 2009, the FN could claim in these elections to be the party of 
one in three to one in six voters throughout the length and breadth of metropolitan France. 
This was a claim buttressed by finishing first in 16 of the 22 metropolitan regions and in 71 
of the 96 departments, scoring 30-40 per cent in 25 of these (Roger, 2014).  
 
The factors playing in the FN’s favour in these elections went beyond the party’s newfound 
momentum and the opportunity offered by the proportional voting system. The elections were 
held exactly two years into the most unpopular presidency since records began, with François 
Hollande’s campaign promises to offer an alternative to austerity, kickstart economic 
recovery and bring down unemployment translating into public spending cuts, a stalled 
economy and relentlessly rising joblessness. Whatever the dangers of historical reductionism, 
it was hard to resist memories of 1984 when Hollande’s Socialist predecessor, François 
Mitterrand, and his first Prime Minister, Pierre Mauroy, plumbed the depths of unpopularity 
in a context of deepening economic recession and soaring unemployment that saw the first 
spike in support for the FN. Then, however, a relatively unknown FN had trailed in fourth 
after a powerful centre-right alliance on 43 per cent, a deeply implanted PS on over 20 per 
cent and a still viable Communist Party (PCF) on just over 11 per cent.  
 
2014 was of a different order. The UMP and the PS both delivered their worst performance 
on record, while the PCF could claim only a portion of the 6.3 per cent mustered by the Front 
de Gauche and one of its three seats in the European Parliament. As in the March municipal 
elections, the FN’s capacity to hurt centre-right and left alike was confirmed, with many of 
the party’s gains being achieved in former strongholds of the left. The FN drew especially 
high support from voters hardest hit by economic recession who might once have turned 
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more readily to a Socialist or Communist alternative. IPSOS polling showed support for the 
FN at 43 per cent among blue-collar workers, 38 per cent among low-skilled employees and 
37 per cent among unemployed voters. Those with the poorest levels of education and the 
lowest incomes were most disposed to vote FN (37 per cent and 30-31 per cent respectively), 
while the party drew 8 per cent of those feeling closest to the PCF/Front de Gauche and 6 per 
cent of those who had voted for Hollande in the first round of the 2012 presidential election. 
Support for the FN also reached 30 per cent among voters aged under 35, those most exposed 
to a youth unemployment rate running close to 25 per cent and now twice as likely to vote for 
the FN as for the Socialists or the UMP, with other parties exerting an even weaker counter-
appeal among this age group (IPSOS, 2014). 
 
In a context of sustained economic adversity, the Hollande administration’s privileging of 
certain high-profile social issues (same-sex marriage and adoption, reform of the justice 
sytem) and its early attempts to address the deficit by raising taxes prompted a radicalisation 
of opposition from which the FN could only benefit (as borne out, it seemed, by the 15 per 
cent of Sarkozy’s first-round voters from 2012 now drawn to Marine Le Pen’s party). This 
radicalisation of opposition sparing neither governing Socialists nor centre-right was part of a 
wider anti-system, anti-elite groundswell that found expression in the Europhobia articulated 
by the FN in these elections. While the UMP and the PS played down their inherent support 
for the European Union (EU), in deference to their own internal oppositions, the FN gave full 
vent to an anti-EU discourse that clearly chimed with most of its voters, resonating with 
doubts over Brussels-led austerity economics and the virtues of open borders. With 
immigration, purchasing power, the euro zone crisis and unemployment the main issues at 
play in these elections, polling found 83 per cent of FN supporters judging France’s EU 
membership to be worsening the effects of economic crisis, 58 per cent deeming it ‘a bad 
thing’, and 66 per cent wishing France to quit the euro zone and return to the franc (IPSOS, 
2014). 
 
The FN was the incontestable winner of these elections. Yet its apparently spectacular 
performance must be set in the context, first, of the elections themselves and, second, of the 
wider utility of its victory. With a near-record abstention rate of 57.6 per cent, the 24.9 per 
cent of the vote won by the FN equated to just 10.1 per cent of the electoral register. This was 
significantly better than the 6 per cent, 5.6 per cent and 5.2 per cent of registered voters 
attracted to the FN in its three previously strongest European election performances (1984, 
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1989 and 1994), but it was barely an advance on the 9.6 per cent of registered voters who had 
supported the party in its legislative election high point of 1997, and it was well down on the 
13.9 per cent of the electoral register secured by Marine Le Pen in the first round of the 
presidential election of 2012. It was also less than the 11.7 per cent of the electoral register 
won by Jean-Marie Le Pen in the presidential poll of 2002, the 11.4 per cent in 1995 and the 
11.5 per cent as far back as 1988. So, as a share of potential vote rather than actual vote, these 
European elections marked less of an unprecedented advance than appearances suggested.  
 
Presidential elections under Jean-Marie Le Pen’s leadership were viewed as opportunities to 
broaden support through a personal appeal that would then be transferred to the party. This 
never worked.  Between presidential and ensuing legislative elections, the FN vote share 
invariably fell (-4.7 per cent in 1988, -5.7 per cent in 2002, -6.1 per cent in 2007, -4.3 per 
cent in 2012). Measured against the 4.8 million votes won by Jean-Marie Le Pen in the first 
round of the 2002 presidential election, the 4.7 million votes won in the 2014 European 
elections not only showed no advance in more than a decade: they concealed a still less 
favourable comparison with the 6.5 million voters estimated to have voted for Le Pen in at 
least one of the two rounds in 2002 (Shields, 2007: 290). That same numerical pool would be 
recuperated by Marine Le Pen with her 6.4 million presidential votes in 2012, against which 
the 2014 European elections marked a loss of some 1.7 million – proof that presidential 
elections were still setting the bar too high for the party. 
 
Part of that relative loss in 2014 is explained by the highly mobilising nature of presidential 
elections and the weaker mobilisation for other elections, most notably European. Poll 
findings showed that, of Marine Le Pen voters from 2012 who turned out for the European 
elections in 2014, 93 per cent voted FN. This was a much higher level of voter loyalty than 
that for any other party and suggested the consolidation of the FN electorate. Polls also 
found, however, that only 50 per cent of Le Pen voters from 2012 did vote in 2014 (IPSOS, 
2014; OpinionWay, 2014). This failure to get more than one in two of its former voters out 
might be understood as a function of the political disenchantment on which the FN has 
sought to capitalise in growing its electorate; but it signifies, too, that disenchanted, 
politically pessimistic and negatively mobilised voters are not a reliably solid electoral corps. 
 
This raises the question of the range of the FN’s electoral appeal. The ‘neither right nor left’ 
strategy may have served the party well in bringing numbers of voters who reject the politics 
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of the mainstream. In the European elections, the FN attracted 35 per cent of voters with no 
partisan attachment to any party of right or left; but only one registered elector in four 
(IPSOS, 2014) or five (OpinionWay, 2014) classing themselves in this category was 
estimated to have voted. So the FN managed to mobilise only a very small proportion of 
politically disengaged potential voters, the great majority being inclined instead to abstain. 
 
In reaching out to both right and left, moreover, the FN was attempting to reconcile 
incompatibles. The annual TNS Sofres poll of February 2015 measuring support for the FN 
showed 85 per cent of UMP sympathisers favouring stronger measures to deal with petty 
crime, but only 18 per cent agreeing with the FN’s core policy of withdrawal from the euro 
and return to the franc; it also showed 63 per cent support among left-leaning respondents for 
the defence of traditional values, falling to 23 per cent on another key FN policy, the 
restoration of capital punishment (TNS Sofres, 2015). Increasingly pronounced in the FN’s 
policy agenda is a structural divide between an authoritarian social conservatism apt to 
resonate with more right-wing elements of the UMP – now renamed ‘the Republicans’ – and 
a statist, welfarist discourse reaching out to the economically vulnerable. This socially right-
leaning, economically left-leaning appeal may not preclude a strong composite vote in the 
first round of elections; but, combined with the FN’s enduring credibility deficit as a 
prospective party of government (TNS Sofres, 2015), it complicates the prospects for forming 
a winning majority in the second round.   
 
Finally, if the measure of political success is what a party can do with its gains, the European 
elections of 2014 were a mitigated success only for the FN. Having pledged to storm the 
bastion of Euro-federalism and take back ‘territorial sovereignty, monetary sovereignty and 
budgetary sovereignty’ (Delaunay, 2013), Marine Le Pen’s cohort of 24 MEPs soon found 
themselves little more than an irrelevance consigned to the margins of the European 
Parliament. Their failure initially to form a parliamentary group (requiring 25 MEPs from at 
least seven EU member states) reduced them to an informal alliance with similarly ostracised 
forces in the Dutch and Austrian Freedom Parties, the Belgian Vlaams Belang and the Italian 
Lega Nord.  
 
Deprived of the financial, administrative and procedural benefits of having an official group, 
the FN had to watch as effective leadership of the anti-EU cause was assumed by Nigel 
Farage of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), who refused to countenance an alliance with 
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the FN on the grounds that ‘anti-Semitism and general prejudice remain[ed] in the DNA of 
the party’ (Waterfield, 2013). Farage pressed ahead to form his Europe of Freedom and 
Direct Democracy (EFDD) group, a motley assortment of Italy’s Five Star Movement, the 
Sweden Democrats, and parties from Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Poland. Rebuffed by 
the UKIP leader, Marine Le Pen had to endure the spectacle of his parliamentary group being 
made possible only by a defector from the FN, Joëlle Bergeron, who allowed the EFDD to 
claim representation from a seventh member state and thereby qualify as a formally 
constituted group. By contrast, Marine Le Pen’s failed attempt in summer 2014 to put 
together a rival group was a step back from where the FN had been able to position itself at 
the start of a number of previous legislatures (1984-89, 1989-94, 1999-2004, 2004-09), when 
it had led parliamentary groups of different compositions and durations and weighed more 
significantly on the European parliamentary process. Though ‘first party of France’ the FN 
might claim to be in these most recent European elections, it was a boast that rang hollow in 
the corridors of Strasbourg.    
 
 
The Departmental elections – a ‘political landscape in irreversible upheaval’? 
 
The departmental elections of March 2015 were to be the test of whether the FN could retain 
this lead position in elections with very different stakes and despite a return to the two-round 
majority voting system. These elections, involving 98 of France’s 101 departments, 
inaugurated a new electoral map that redrew cantonal boundaries, cutting their number from 
4,035 to 2,054. The other major innovation was the introduction of male-female tandems 
(‘binômes’) designed to give exact parity for the first time to election outcomes. With two 
candidates per party seeking election in 2,054 cantons, a total of 4,108 seats were at stake 
across the new departmental councils (‘conseils départementaux’) designated to replace the 
general councils (‘conseils généraux’) that had formerly served as the departmental 
governing bodies. 
 
Polling 5,142,177 votes, the FN took 25.2 per cent of the ballot nationally, on a 50.2 per cent 
turnout, but fell short of predictions that it would win the first round with a score possibly in 
excess of 30 per cent. The UMP and its centrist allies totalled 29.4 per cent of the vote, with 
the Socialists and their Union de la Gauche allies coming third on 21.5 per cent and the Front 




Compared with less than 5 per cent in the 2008 cantonal elections and 15 per cent in those of 
2011, there could be no doubting the dynamic behind the FN’s performance in 2015. That 
dynamic was reflected in part through the number of cantons contested by an FN that had 
always found this an almost impossible electoral level on which to make an impact. Having 
fielded candidates in 1,035 cantons in 2008 and 1,441 in 2011, it had won not a single seat in 
2008 and only two in 2011 (Gougou and Labouret, 2011: 387). In 2015, the FN contested 
1,909 of the 2,054 cantons at stake, fielding a total 3,818 candidates in line with the gender 
parity ‘binôme’ system imposed for these elections. With the requirement to nominate 
reserves (‘suppléant’ and ‘suppléante’) for each pair of candidates fielded, the FN’s slate 
comprised fully 7,636 candidates and reserves, larger than that of the UMP, the Socialists and 
all other parties.  
 
These elections set a new record for the FN as a party both in terms of ballot share and 
number of votes, its 5.1 million votes (12 per cent of the electoral register) exceeding the 4.7 
million (10.1 per cent of the electoral register) won at the European elections of May 2014. It 
came first in 43 of the 98 departments involved, performing strongly in traditional bastions of 
the south – Var (38.9 per cent), Vaucluse (37.4 per cent), Gard (35.5 per cent) – and 
developing strongholds of the north – Aisne (38.7 per cent), Pas-de-Calais (35.6 per cent), 
Oise (35.1 per cent), Haute-Marne (35.1 per cent). Again, as in the European elections, there 
was ample evidence of the FN’s penetration of departments in the centre and west, with 26.4 
per cent in Sarthe, 24.9 per cent in Cher, 24.6 per cent in Charente-Maritime, 23.4 per cent in 
Indre-et-Loire, 22.6 per cent in Vendée, 22 per cent in Maine-et-Loire, and even a canton 
(Nord-Médoc) gained in the south-western Gironde (Interior Ministry, 2015).   
 
FN scores were particularly strong in locations where the party had secured mayors in 2014. 
In Le Pontet in the Vaucluse, the suspended FN mayor Joris Hébrard and his tandem partner 
Danielle Brun won election at the first round despite the invalidation of the municipal 
election result on grounds of procedural irregularity (Le Monde, 2015). The FN also won with 
first-round majorities in the cantons of Fréjus (Var), Vic-sur-Aisne (Aisne) and Eurville-
Bienville (Haute-Marne), going on to win run-offs in Beaucaire, Villers-Cotterêts, both 
cantons of Hénin-Beaumont and all three cantons of Béziers. These results in fiefdoms of FN 
mayors were a strong vindication of Marine Le Pen’s strategy of building from the base and 
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consolidating local gains through interlinking elections, with many of the municipal 
councillors elected in March 2014 contesting cantonal seats in 2015.    
 
In all, the FN won 31 cantons, sending 62 councillors into 14 of France’s departmental 
councils. Within its own limited terms, this was a resounding success for a party that had 
never at any time held more than three of the 4,035 cantonal seats previously available, even 
if it lost the single canton of Brignoles (Var) with which it went into these elections. It gave 
evidence of the FN’s growing ability in certain locations to prevail not just against divided 
opposition in three-way run-offs but against more concerted opposition in two-way run-offs 
with both centre-right (Béziers-2, Villers-Cotterêts) and left (Beaucaire, Béziers-1, Béziers-3, 
Hénin-Beaumont-1, Hénin-Beaumont-2). In other locations with FN mayors where the party 
failed to win the canton (Cogolin/Sainte-Maxime, Le Luc, Hayange), it nonetheless held its 
majority at the municipal commune level, showing that here too support was consolidated. 
All of this chimed with an IFOP poll of March 2015 showing levels of satisfaction with 
mayors one year on from the municipal elections to be markedly higher (at 73 per cent on 
average) among respondents under FN governance than among those under mayors from 
other parties (Gaboulaud, 2015).   
 
A sociological survey of these elections by OpinionWay confirmed much that now defines 
the FN vote. It showed strong support among blue-collar workers (47 per cent), low-skilled 
employees (34 per cent), unemployed voters (31 per cent), those on short-term or precarious 
work contracts (33 per cent), and social housing tenants (34 per cent). Low educational 
attainment and low income were again strong predictors of an FN vote (with 41 per cent and 
33 per cent of these categories drawn to the party), as was lack of faith in right or left to 
govern (38 per cent) and a desire for greater protectionism (50 per cent). Though these were 
local elections with local stakes, the FN vote was once again marked by a strong anti-
Europeanism, with the party drawing support from 65 per cent of respondents judging 
France’s membership of the EU to be ‘a bad thing’ and 67 per cent of those wishing France to 
abandon the euro and return to the franc (OpinionWay, 2015). 
 
A simple arithmetical question hung over the results of the first round. Had the FN repeated 
its feat of May 2014 to finish first or had that claim passed, as widely reported, to the UMP? 
The breakdown of voting as published by the Interior Ministry was incontrovertible (Laurent, 
2015; Pouchard, 2015a). Votes cast for candidates running on specific party labels, once 
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extricated from the compound voting for ‘binômes’, confirmed that the FN had topped the 
first round with its 5.1 million votes, ahead of the PS (3.3 million) and the UMP (3.2 
million). It also topped the second round with 4 million votes, ahead of the UMP on just 
under 4 million and the PS on 3.6 million. The strength of the UMP’s performance in these 
elections came both from votes cast for UMP candidates and from its alliance with the 
centrists of the UDI and in part MoDem. That alliance allowed the combined centre-right and 
centre to be the first political force in France, but it did not make the UMP the first party in 
these elections, a claim to which the FN continued to hold with some justification. 
 
This poses, again, a bigger question. What good is finishing ‘first’ if a party can do little or 
nothing with that success? Despite totalling over a quarter of the vote in the first round (25.2 
per cent) and close to a quarter in the second (22.2 per cent), the FN was systematically 
squeezed out of almost all of the 1,107 run-offs it contested, including the 320 cantons where 
it led the poll at the first round. It averaged some 35 per cent of the vote in those cantons 
where it was present in the second round, with scores of 45-50 per cent in almost a hundred 
of them (Le Point, 2015). But the hard reality was that it won only 22 of 834 two-way run-
offs (19 against the left and three against the centre-right) and only five of 273 
‘triangulaires’, where it should have expected to perform more effectively against divided 
opposition.  
 
In all, the FN managed to harness only 1.5 per cent of the seats across the departmental 
councils of France (62 out of 4,108) and failed to generate a critical mass of support within 
any department to win control. Here again was a graphic demonstration of the withering 
effects upon the FN of two-round majority voting, given its isolation within the party system 
and the consequent difficulty of increasing sufficiently its reservoir of support between the 
rounds in all but a few places. The Aude department in the southern Languedoc-Roussillon 
region provided a classic illustration. There the FN scored 33.7 per cent in the first round and 
39 per cent in the second, but it won not a single cantonal seat out of 38 (32 of them going to 
a PS that had trailed the FN on 32.1 per cent in the first round but, crucially, could extend 
beyond that base to average 44.6 per cent in the second).    
 
Even in those departments where the FN had hoped at least to play a determining role in the 
election of council presidents (Aisne, Vaucluse, Gard), it did not in the end exert any decisive 
impact. As a preliminary to potential agreements with the UMP, it issued a ‘charter’ with a 
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set of non-negotiable conditions, pledging itself against council tax rises, the reduction of 
local public services, welfare benefit fraud, the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in crèches, 
and subsidies for multicultural associations or projects (Front National, 2015). In the Gard, 
the centre-right chose to cede control of the council to the Socialists rather than sign up to 
these conditions; in Aisne, the UDI took control with a relative majority, again rather than 
enter agreement with the FN; and in the Vaucluse, stalemate was resolved by a centre-right 
president being elected on grounds of age (a procedural provision) rather than through any 
deal with the FN.  
 
By the end of this so-called ‘third round’ to elect council presidents, the UMP controlled 45 
departments, the UDI 14, the ‘divers droite’ seven and MoDem one, while the PS controlled 
26, the Left Radicals three, the ‘divers gauche’ three, the Front de Gauche one, and a ‘divers’ 
alliance one (Pouchard, 2015b). Correlating these outcomes with ballot share in both rounds 
underlined the disproportionality of the electoral system, as did the final distribution of 
council seats across all departments, with 1,138 for the UMP, 1,008 for the PS and 379 for 
the UDI set against 62 for the FN. Even the Front de Gauche, with 6.1 per cent then 2 per 
cent of the vote over both rounds, took 156 seats while the PCF retained control of the 
department of Val-de-Marne (Pouchard, 2015a). 
 
Far from presaging, in Manuel Valls’s words, a ‘political landscape in irreversible upheaval’ 
(Libération, 2015), these elections marked a return to politics as usual, with the swing from a 
left-dominated (61/40) departmental map to a right-dominated (67/34) one being the 
overriding story. After a first round that appeared to confirm the shift from a two-bloc to a 
three-bloc system, the bipolarisation that had defined electoral competition throughout the 
Fifth Republic returned with all its implacable logic. There were in effect two elections here: 
one to determine electoral strength, the other to distribute executive power and influence 
within governing councils. The first, as the FN found once again, is reduced to abstraction if 
it does not lead to concrete outcomes in the second. 
 
 
The FN and French political space: bipolarised or tripartite? 
 
‘Can the Front National come to power?’, asked Alexandre Dézé (2012: 157) in his historical 
survey of the party’s evolution. Can the FN ‘gain sufficient ground to overturn the political 
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system?’, reflected Pascal Perrineau (2014: 215) in his more recent review of the party’s 
progress. The two questions are of a piece. For it is only by disrupting the established model 
of party politics in France, ‘overturning the political system’ and – crucially – the 
bipolarising imperatives that govern electoral competition, that the FN can nurture the 
prospect of acceding to power.  
 
This returns us to a debate that has divided analyses of French politics between those arguing 
for a realignment of political space into a three-bloc party system (Grunberg and 
Schweisguth, 2002, 2003) and those wedded to bipolarisation as the fundamental, enduring 
structural model (Andersen and Evans, 2003). That both positions have a strong rationale to 
commend them, and that analysts can move from one interpretation to the other as the 
evidence of the moment dictates (Grunberg and Haegel, 2007), shows the difficulty of 
seeking a definitive resolution to this question (de Voogd, 2014; Revault d'Allonnes, 2015; 
Hausalter, 2015). A central argument of this article has been that, as they relate to the 
electoral process, both readings have their place, with the tripartition of French politics 
between left, centre-right and FN finding expression in the first round of elections and 
bipolarisation asserting all its traditional dominance in the second. Put another way, the FN 
has managed to break down the bipolarised structure of French electoral competition to a 
point – but only to a point.   
 
In addition to first-round voting, election run-offs staging three-way (left/centre-right/far-
right) contests might be expected to serve as some measure of a tripartite structure in French 
politics. Given the difficulty of mustering the absolute majority required to prevail in two-
party run-offs, second-round ‘triangulaires’ should offer the FN opportunities to secure 
victory through a relative majority only and to impose itself as a viable rival to the 
mainstream blocs. Yet the record of the FN’s performance in such ‘triangulaires’ is 
extremely poor, demonstrating not any newly entrenched three-way model of French party 
politics but, once again, its enduring bipolarisation. Of 28 ‘triangulaires’ contested in the 
2012 legislative elections, the FN won only two; of 273 contested in the 2015 departmental 
elections, it won five (finishing second in 54 and third in 214). Though the ‘Republican front’ 
between left and centre-right in run-offs against the FN no longer functions as a rule, other 
factors (increased voter turnout, tactical voting, erosion of FN support) combine to favour 
left-right bipolarisation to the almost invariable exclusion of the FN (Delwit, 2012: 141-142; 




So where does this leave the FN in its ambitions and prospects? When Marine Le Pen was 
elected leader at the party’s national congress in Tours in January 2011, she was clear about 
the significance of the moment. This was, she declared, the start of her party’s ‘irresistible 
rise to power’ (Le Pen, 2011). A rhetorical imperative upon an incoming party leader 
perhaps, but her words signalled a fundamental change in the purpose of the FN. Under Jean-
Marie Le Pen, the FN had been defined by its outsider status, a nuisance party whose 
ambitions were restricted to the electoral arena, privileging vote-maximisation over office-
seeking. It engaged symbolically in a strategy for winning power (preparing for ‘government’ 
as far back as its Nice Congress of 1990 under the slogan ‘The conquest of power’); but its 
comfort zone was one of perennial opposition. The party’s one significant experience of local 
office in the 1990s led to an acrimonious split between those, under Bruno Mégret, 
committed to making the FN a party of government and those, under Jean-Marie Le Pen, 
content to perpetuate its role as a party of protest (Shields, 2007: 275-281).  
 
Since becoming leader, what has Marine Le Pen achieved through her cultivation of a more 
modern and moderate party image allied to a new ‘strategy for winning power’ (Le Pen, 
2011)? She has overseen a sharp rise in the party’s first-round vote share nationally across a 
range of elections: from 10.4 to 17.9 per cent in presidential elections, 4.3 to 13.6 per cent in 
legislative, 0.9 to 4.8 per cent in municipal, 6.3 to 24.9 per cent in European, and 4.8 to 15 
per cent then 25.2 per cent in cantonal/departmental elections. These results attest to a strong 
electoral dynamic that has moved the FN forward in terms of vote-maximisation, but have 
they brought the party any closer to office? Only the municipal elections of 2014 yielded 
tangible gains in terms of executive power, but these were both severely limited and far from 
unprecedented, reminiscent of advances made two decades before in the municipal elections 
of 1995.  
 
The elections of 2014 and 2015 were not transformational: they were a reaffirmation of the 
status quo. In terms of electoral representation at the various levels of governance in France, 
the FN still barely exists. The series of elections since 2011 brought it two National 
Assembly deputies out of 577 (to which it added in September 2014 two senators out of 348), 
1,544 municipal councillors out of 519,417, and 62 departmental councillors out of 4,108. As 
a presence within these elected assemblies, the FN occupies 0.4 per cent of parliamentary 
seats across both houses, 0.3 per cent of municipal council seats and 1.5 per cent of 
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departmental council seats. The only elections run on full proportional representation which 
returned seats to the measure of the party’s vote (24 of the 74 allotted to France in the 
European Parliament) came to nothing in real terms when the FN failed to form a 
parliamentary group through which to make its presence felt in Strasbourg. The belated 
formation of that group in June 2015 gave the FN and its allies more resources and more 
prominence within the European Parliament but did not alter in any way the balance of real 
power there.   
 
Both the European elections and the departmental elections raised the question therefore of 
what being the ‘first’ party of France means. Counting votes in a particular election is one 
narrow method of asserting this, but there are other methods too. The PS, for all its 
tribulations in government, enjoys an unshakeable hold on the levers of national power; 
across all levels of subnational governance too, it is still the party with the largest combined 
number of elected officials, ahead of the Republicans then the UDI. By this measure, the FN 
emerges not as the first party but as the sixth. Then there is the dominance of the Republicans 
across the municipal and departmental maps of France, where they exert control over broadly 
two-thirds of town and country. This is a scale on which the FN barely registers, coming 
eighth in the list of parties or groupings represented in France’s departmental councils, with 
18 times fewer seats than the Republicans and 16 times fewer than the PS (Pouchard, 2015a). 
And while only the Republicans and the PS have any realistic prospect of winning France’s 
two key electoral prizes, the presidency and the National Assembly, Marine Le Pen would 
achieve no more in real terms by getting to the presidential run-off in 2017, if poll predictions 
are borne out, than her father did in 2002.  
 
We are left, then, with a party that has since 2011 advanced further and faster down the route 
set for it by Jean-Marie Le Pen (winning votes), but that has yet to gain traction on the route 
set by Marine Le Pen (winning representation leading to power). In an interview with Le 
Monde in March 2014, the FN leader declared that what the party most needed was a record 
in office to demonstrate its governing competence (Mestre and Monnot, 2014). The towns 
won in March 2014 were a modest local start, but the elections of 2015 showed that winning 
a single department out of 98 at stake was still beyond the FN. France may, as Pascal 
Perrineau asserts, have entered ‘a new chapter in its political history’ with three major 
competing forces now at work (Cordelier, 2015); but it will take more than isolated successes 
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to break the bipolarising mould within which electoral competition continues to favour the 
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